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Abstract The European Union wishes to develop strat-
egies to increase the number of urban transport passen-
gers over the coming years. Urban transport is the key
transport mode for the decrease of congestion, pollution,
energy consumption and limitation of land use by
transport in cities. Urban areas are the drivers of the
European economy. This implication of European au-
thorities rests on the means mobilised in European
research projects. These research projects aim at con-
ceiving the common model of the future safe and
interchangeable guided transport systems in Europe and
highlights the problems related to the harmonisation of
the steps of safety certification of such systems.
Therefore, the concept of interchangeability ((UGTMS),
(MODURBAN)), is important and, it means that system
components can be produced from any suppliers and
replaced without any substantial change in functionality
or performance. It also allows the system to adapt to
technology evolutions without significant modifications
to its architecture. The main barriers for reaching these
objectives are the complexity of the existing systems, the
diversity of national legislation and the lack of interna-
tional standards. The common model of this framework
is needed to open the competitive market for urban
transport.
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1 Introduction
Transport reliability, availability, efficiency and safety are
some of the basic conditions for the growth of quality of
life in the European Union [3, 10].
High quality transport is needed for strengthening the
competitiveness of the European economy. This covers
transport of persons as well as transport of goods.
This need has encouraged European institutions to set up
several research projects. These European projects mainly
aim to design, develop and try-out an open and innovating
architecture with common model and interfaces for trans-
port systems. Now, each country applies their own safety
assessment, but it is also clear that the recent applications
are assessed more and more taking into account the
European standards [3–5].
As explain above, the interchangeability aims to harmo-
nise interfaces for control-command, energy saving and
access sub-assemblies for metro and light rail rolling stock.
The objective of this work is to highlight the importance to
have a common model of safety for urban guided transport
equipment.
This article can be loosely divided into 4 parts. We
establish in the first part, the different types of transport
and, in the second part, the needed framework for
interchangeability. The third part describes the safety
common model identified following the first elements of
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similarities for UGT (Urban Guided Transport). In the
last part, the different aspects of interchangeability are
introduced.
2 Different types of transports
On the transport market there are different sectors. The road
sector is especially successful. But this causes large
problems of congestion, pollution and land-use. A better
use of the different types of transport through creation of
the framework for improving competition between the
transport modes is necessary.
2.1 Railway transport
Railway transport has a long tradition of being operated by
state-owned companies. The influence of national and even
regional or local characteristics cultivated by political
interests has brought a wide diversity of differences in the
fields of legislation, technologies; operational & service,
practises and safety & security strategies.
The European efforts for harmonising the legislation and
standardisation in the field of international, national and
regional railway transport are the starting conditions for more
competition and success of railway transport in the future. The
efforts of different R&D— projects like ERTMS (ERTMS),
MODTRAIN (MODTRAIN) and others, as well as the 3
“railway— packages” (RAILWAY PACKAGES) are paving
the way for the future growth of railway transport. They are
basic for better interoperability of railways on the different
national railway networks and future European High-speed
Corridors TEN-T (TEN T). Competition between the
different international and national railway operators
(private, public or Public— Private Partnership), both
for passenger transport as well as for transport of goods,
is a precondition for the competition between road
transport and railway transport. Long distance railway
lines are now in competition with air transport.
2.2 Urban guided transport (UGT)
Urban Guided Transport (UGT) is a public transport system
in an urban area with motorised vehicles operated on a
guideway. This document deals especially with metro—
systems, light rail— systems and tram— systems.
Because of special needs (different to those of the
railways) for service (customer needs), operation and
technology, Urban Guided Transport will use only a small
part of the benefits supported by the European Commission
for the Railways.
UGT systems are an integrated part of public transport in
urban areas with a very high demand by citizens, operated
with high frequency, in peak hours. They are the backbones
of transport in large cities.
The European Commission supports the development and
the competitiveness of UGT by different R&D projects:
UGTMS [17], MODURBAN [13], URBAN Track (URBAN
TRACK) and others, as well as by funding of infrastructure
investments in cities. Because of the strong influence of
national laws and local specifics the different UGT systems
have “tailor-made” infrastructures, technologies and are not
comparable.
Metro systems are isolated, and therefore, there was no
need for interoperability between different systems. Even
for tram systems the vehicles normally do not fit to
different infrastructures. But that means that customers
travelling in different or even foreign cities have to “learn”
the rules of the local operators.
The operators are mostly national or even regional or
local because of the lack of standards. The development of
equipment for the different systems is very costly and the
existing situation is a barrier for free competition among the
suppliers.
3 The needed framework for interchangeability
The goal, in short-term, is to design through European
research projects, bases on the control/command system
with strong constraints : the interchangeability and interop-
erability of materials in the transborder zones. The launch-
ing on the market of such systems is subject to strong
requirements of safety [7, 8].
Interoperability is the ability of a transport network to
operate safely different trains on interoperable infrastructures,
communicating the necessary control-command data with the
trackside (without major change in functionality or perfor-
mance). This ability supposes that all regulations, technical and
operational conditions are met in compliance with the require-
ments applicable for a given grade of automation of the line.
Interoperability also means that the sidetrack is able to work
with trains, which are equipped at a smaller automation level.
Interchangeability allows the replacement of one com-
ponent supplied by one industry provider by the same
component supplied by another provider.
Even if interoperability is generally not needed in the
networks of UGT systems, interchangeability of compo-
nents is a key for the development of the European market
for the supply industry.
There have to be agreements on cross— acceptance of
nationally-certified products for the whole market in
Europe.
To open the different national (or even local) markets
there has to be a common European framework of
legislation and standardisation.
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At the moment, the equipment of the local systems is
certified on the basis of very differently fixed national laws
and directives. The decisions on certifications are made by
local authorities. The responsibilities are neither on Euro-
pean nor on national levels. Because of all these reasons it
is quite difficult to harmonize the requirements on the
European level. Therefore, in the European R&D projects
UGTMS— Urban Guided Transport Management System
[17] and MODURBAN— Modular Urban Guided Rail
Systems [13] the first attempts were made to fix the
standards for the calculation concerning the safety and
quality levels.
3.1 The key barriers for cross acceptance of UGT
components
Cross acceptance means: the status achieved by a product
that has been accepted by one Authority on the basis of the
relevant European Standards and is acceptable to other
Authorities without the necessity for further assessment [5].
In parallel with the MODURBAN project, international
standardisation of general system functional requirements
were started by the International Electrotechnical Commis-
sion (IEC).
The international Norm: IEC 62290-1 UGTMS,
“Urban guided transport management and command/
control systems— Part 1: System principles and funda-
mental concepts”, was completed in the year 2006. The
Working Group “WG 40” is now in the discussion on
IEC 62290-2 UGTMS. “Urban Guided Transport Manage-
ment and Command/Control systems— Part 2: Functional
Specifications”.
These standards will be keys for the development of
products with cross-border acceptance in Europe.
But the main barrier will still exist. The European
countries have different approaches for the certification of
the safety of the integrated Urban Guided Transport
systems and their components. That is for new systems,
extensions of existing systems and for all new developed
components used as replacement parts or for the upgrading
of existing systems.
4 Toward a common safety model for UGT
4.1 The safety principles
The CENELEC standards EN 50126 [3], and EN 50129
[5] define “safety” as the freedom from unacceptable
levels of risk. So, the old question: “how safe is safe
enough?” is reduced to the question: “what levels of risk
are acceptable?”. EN 50126 recommends that a generally
accepted principle should be used and introduces the
three risk acceptance principles, GAME, ALARP and
MEM:
4.1.1 The French safety principle [6]
GAME (Globalement Au Moins Equivalent)
According to Decree STPG 2003-425/9 May 2003
(sécurité des transports publics guidés)
Main articles are:
– article °3 states that all modification of guided
transport is considered as essential if safety demon-
stration is modified
– article °5 GAME principle is compulsory:
(GAME means “Globalement Au Moins Equivalent”—
“All new guided transport system must offer a level of
risk globally at least as good as that offered by any
equivalent existing system”).
According to Decree STPG 2003-425/9 May 2003 the
following elements are requested for the Safety Approval
Process:
DEFINITION CASE DD: “Dossier de Definition”; (defini-
tion case) is the first step to initialise a dialog between the
person in charge of work and the safety authority. It
establishes the legal framework proposing the preliminary
safety and quality plans and the main characteristics (func-
tional, technical, the general Safety targets). It may be
considered as a concept submission to the safety authority
who accept it or not.
PRELIMINARY SAFETY CASE DPS: “Dossier Préliminaire
de Sécurité”; (Preliminary Safety Case) specifies in detail
the Safety targets, the requirements, the methods and the
principles used to reach them. A Preliminary Hazards
Analysis is included.
An independent safety assessor report delivered by an
independent Assessor Body is added to the file. The Safety
Authority approves the DPS, the starting point of work is
given by supplying the funds.
SAFETY CASE DS: “Dossier de Sécurité”; Safety Case,
this final and most important document, includes the DD
and the updated DPS, and has to demonstrate that the
requirements described in the DPS are fulfilled.
4.1.2 The UK safety principle [18]
Responsibility for the regulation of health and safety on the
railways and other guided transport systems was transferred
from the Health and Safety Commission (HSC) and Health
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and Safety Executive (HSE) to the Office of Rail
Regulation (ORR) on 1 April 2006.
The Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 (HSWA)
(Updates 1992 and 1999) is the principal health and safety
law in Great Britain. It places general duties on employers
to ensure the health, safety and welfare at work of their
employees and to conduct their undertaking so that persons
not in their employment are not exposed to risks to their
health and safety. Employers must ensure “As Low As
Reasonably Practicable” that these duties are met. This
qualification is abbreviated to “ALARP”— Assess and
reduce risk so far as is reasonably practicable.
The ALARP principle (As LowAs Reasonably Practicable)
is described in it:
Between the region of unacceptable risk and the region
of broadly accepted risk, there is a tolerability region where
risk is undertaken only if a benefit is desired and where
each risk must be made as low as reasonably practicable
(see Fig. 1 below).
4.1.3 The German safety principle [2, 16]
In Germany, the federal (Bundes Land) level concentrates
the legislative framework.
The German approval process presents two different
legal frameworks:
– the first concerns heavy metropolitan railways (region-
al lines or commuter lines) generally considered as
railway applications which are under the law AEG [1]
with the Regulation named EBO (Federal Regulation
for Construction & Operation of Railways—
Eisenbahn-Bau-und Betriebsordnung);
– the second concerns urban guided transport which do not
interface with railway lines. These networks, are covered
by the law PBefG [14] with the Regulation named
BOStrab (Federal Regulation for Construction & Oper-
ation of Urban Guided Transport Systems— Verord-
nung über den Bau— und Betrieb von Straßenbahnen).
MEM (Minimum Endogenous Mortality) The individual
risk due to a particular technical system must not exceed
2*10-4 fatalities/person*year of the minimum endogenous
mortality.
This principle is not used because there is no direct
relation to railways.
In practice, use the following values is allowed:
– R1<−10−5 deaths per person per year,
– R2<−10−4 serious injuries per person per year,
– R3<−10−3 slight injuries per person per year,
For systems which could produce a large number of deaths,
it is also necessary to take into account a “coefficient of
aversion” which reduces the acceptable risk.
MGS principle The German MGS (Mindestens Gleiche
Sicherheit— at least the same level of safety) is based on
the EBO and is generally the same as the GAME principle.
4.2 SIL (Safety Integrity Level)
In the international standards [3, 5, 12] the level of safety of
a system assuring functions of safety is defined, in a
qualitative way, according to 4 classes:
Level 4, the highest level, applies to the systems
assuring the most critical functions.
Level 3, can apply to posts assuring functions of safety
on lines used for transport;
Level 2, applies to systems assuring functions of control
which, for example, can be used in situations degraded by
the developer to raise a condition of safety;
Level 1, applies to systems used in particular cases of
help or maintenance.
When a system assures a function by no means
connected to the safety, it is of SIL level 0.
The SIL’s notion is particularly useful for computer
systems, notably software, for which it is impossible to
demonstrate the respect of an objective calculated for safety.
It is necessary to note that the SIL of a system is
determined by the experts of the network according to the





ALARP zone or 
tolerability region
Acceptable zone
(the risk is taken only
If a benefit is expected)
(detailed demonstration not required)
The risk can be justified only
Acceptable only if risk cannot be reduced
or if the costs are quite disproportionate to
the expected improvement
Necessary to maintain assurance
hat risk remains at this level
Acceptable if the costs of reducing risk
are greater than the expected improvement
Fig. 1 ALARP principle
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4.3 Evaluation of safety
The most critical problem of cross-border acceptance is
the fact that the existing standards give a discretion
margin for the quantification of safety. This means that
in special cases it depends on the characteristics needed for the
users whether the safety case can be certified or not.
Taking into account the different national philosophies
in Europe this means that there should be only one
model (without gaps) for the calculation of safety cases
to obtain values that have to be accepted in all European
countries.
4.4 National French, German, UK, Hungarian approval
processes
The traditional authorisation, regulation and certification
processes in different European countries for urban trans-
port safety system have been already identified and
analysed [9, 11].
We have analysed the responsibility allocation between
public authorities, certification bodies, assessors, operators
and system suppliers.
After this analysis, we have proposed a questionnaire to
obtain all the types of regulation and certification processes
in the other European countries.
From this analysis, we can conclude that there are
significant similarities and essential differences.
There is, for example, a certain convergence in the use of
European standards and safety principles (GAME or
ALARP). It has also been demonstrated that the document
of reference between the different key players, either during
the design phase or the start up phase, is the safety case.
However, there are quite different procedures in the
European countries but the procedures are not the main
problem.
4.5 Cross acceptance as one condition
for interchangeability
The key to solving the central problem for cross-acceptance
and interchangeability of certified systems and components
produced by different European suppliers is to agree on
safety standards and their approval model at the European
level. By means of this, the European market can be opened
for all products certified by national or even local
authorities.
The example of the railways shows that the cross
acceptance of certified vehicles has started. On the basis
of the three railway packages after a long time of
negotiations the first step for the Railways was done on
16th April, 2008 by French and German authorities
signing a contract to simplify the cross-acceptance of
Railway vehicles of both countries. By means of this, the
costs for certification of railway vehicles in the respec-
tive countries, France or Germany, will be reduced by
70% [15].
5 Additional different aspects of interchangeability
The different laws, regulations and standards on interna-
tional, European and national levels for UGT systems and
even the components obstruct interchangeability addition-
ally. Mechanical and electrical equipments are normally
used for 30 years. Electronic equipment has mainly a life
cycle of 8 to 10 years. This also causes problems for
interchangeability.
5.1 Equipment of infrastructure
Infrastructure of UGT systems is determined by the laws,
regulations and standards for UGT systems (constructions
and buildings, mechanics, electrical equipment, electronic
devices…). The equipment is very often a combination of
different demands and components may have mechanical,
electrical and electronic parts.
The determinations have to be respected in combination
with the safety principles. This means a high complexity for
the evaluation of the equipment of the infrastructure.
In reality most of the components of infrastructure are
internationally accepted.
But there is still the barrier for the acceptance of
certifications on command/control systems and their com-
ponents installed in infrastructure.
5.2 Vehicles
Because of the different generations of vehicles and the
different supplier-specific components and interfaces of
the vehicles, there is a severe difficulty for the inter-
changeability of vehicles and trains, even between
different lines within one network, if the equipment for
the parts of the command/control system installed in the
infrastructure and of the vehicles for coupling, for the
onboard parts of command/control, communication—
systems, passenger— information and other onboard
systems, are not especially constructed for the aspect of
interchangeability.
This problem exists even for vehicles of different
generations produced by a single supplier. It has a great
importance if there are different products of different
suppliers and different generations.
The interchangeability of vehicles and trains is an
important requirement for the optimisation of operational
processes.
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5.3 Equipment of vehicles
The different components of a vehicle have different life—
cycles. Especially when there is a change of components or
even an upgrade of the command/control system, there
should be the opportunity for using onboard— components
of different suppliers.
The complexity of the integration of new components
and the overall responsibility for the safety of the vehicles
means that there are large barriers for interchangeability of
the equipment of vehicles.
5.4 Mechanical and electrical equipment, maintenance
and spare parts
The interchangeability of mechanical and electrical wayside
and on-board equipment can be achieved more easily. But
even for this part of the market the diversity of products is
high. The development of components using new materials,
and the necessity to integrate new parts in existing
solutions, cause problems for maintenance and demands
in many case-specific certifications.
Nevertheless, the different local solutions existing are
still barriers for the competition between even national
suppliers.
5.5 Electronic equipment, maintenance and spare parts
The Integrated solutions for wayside and on-board
equipment with the requirements on Reliability, Avail-
ability and Maintainability have brought new components
where mainly mechanical, electrical and electronic
elements work together. This consequently causes the
problem of Software solutions with very often no open
interfaces. Electronic hardware components very often
have a lower life— cycle than the mechanical and
electrical ones. This demands additional flexibility for
maintenance and replacement of parts. The complexity of
maintenance (plug and play) and the storage of spare
parts make interchangeability of products of different
suppliers almost impossible to achieve.
6 Conclusion
The safety assessment and approval of new or altered
systems are an essential condition to protect people and the
environment from dangers arising from the operation of
guided transport systems.
As explain above, this study shows the complexity of
necessary preconditions for the opening of the market for
the European UGT system supply industry as a part of
cost— efficiency of products and necessary for compet-
itive structures. The example of the railway market
shows that there can be success.
The main key for interchangeability is the European
standardisation for the calculation of the safety-case in
association with an agreement between the stakeholders of
urban guided transport.
It will be necessary to progressively find a common
model for national regulation of member states. But all the
other described barriers should not be under estimated.
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